Arrhythmia/EP
"Perceptions" and misconceptions: Are device "recalls" holding back the growth of ICD therapy?
October 26, 2007 | Steve Stiles

Rockville, MD - The US Food and Drug Administration's public statement [1] on Medtronic's decision to suspend sales of its Spring Fidelis defibrillator leads seemed intended to sooth nerves. But the reported reaction from Congress and public-interest groups [2] seemed as if the lead "recall" were an emerging public-health threat; or were they reacting to frustration borne of déjà vu?

"We know it can be frightening for a patient to learn that a product they rely on so much might have a serious defect," noted the FDA statement. "Patients can be assured that the likelihood of fracture is very low, and the FDA is committed to ensuring that the risk to patients is minimized."

That day, Medtronic had announced a small rise in the lead's fracture rate, not a statistically significant increase but one that seemed likely to become so over time [3,4]. As heartwire recently reported, five patients had died, possibly as a direct or indirect result of Spring Fidelis fractures. About 268 000 of the leads for implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) and cardiac resynchronization therapy/defibrillator (CRT-D) devices had been implanted in patients worldwide, the company stated.

We know it can be frightening for a patient to learn that a product they rely on so much might have a serious defect.

"We recognize that some patients and healthcare professionals might inappropriately interpret the word 'recall' to mean that the devices must be surgically removed and returned to the manufacturer," the FDA stated. That's not what it is recommending, the agency emphasized, although no new ones should be put in patients. Any problems can be handled at the next scheduled clinic visit, it said.

Two days later, the Wall Street Journal reported, "Plaintiffs attorneys, a consumer group, and Iowa Sen Chuck Grassley [R-IA] are examining the history of the Sprint Fidelis leads" [2].

According to the article, from reporters Anna Wilde Mathews and Thomas M Burton, "Mr Grassley, a Republican, last night sent letters to the company and the [FDA] asking for more information about the leads. Separately, consumer group Public Citizen argued in a letter that the company and agency should have taken action sooner."

It went on, "In addition, a group of plaintiffs attorneys, which has been a leader in major heart-device lawsuits, filed suits against Medtronic related to the Sprint Fidelis leads in federal court in Minneapolis and Puerto Rico, according to Hunter Shkolnik, one of the lawyers."



WSJ: Spring Fidelis risk magnified in children

"The defibrillator leads pulled off the market this week by Medtronic Inc may pose a higher risk of fracture in younger adults and children, a population for whom the devices were particularly popular in part because of their small diameter," according to an October 19, 2007 story in the Wall Street Journal [5].

"A lead prone to fracture might break more often in younger, more active people, whose hearts beat faster and place more stress on the leads," write WSJ reporters Mathews and Burton, who acknowledge that "all lead models tend to have higher fracture rates in young patients."

The story cites "preliminary data" from physicians specializing in children and adults with congenital heart disease pointing to a Sprint Fidelis fracture rate of 6.7% over 30 months. The figures were compiled by Dr Wayne H Franklin, described as a pediatric cardiac electrophysiologist at Northwestern University's Feinberg School of Medicine, in Chicago, IL.

Medtronic, according to the story, has reported a 30-month failure rate of 2.3% for all patients implanted with "one particular Sprint Fidelis model. For that same model, Dr Franklin saw a fracture rate of 4.9% among 304 patients in his survey."


Dr William Maisel

Such swift reactions to Medtronic's announcement may indicate a cautious new familiarity with ICDs, after a series of highly publicized recalls in 2005, most involving Guidant devices with design flaws that proved fatal in a few cases. As chronicled by heartwire, the medical literature, and just about every newspaper, those events and how Guidant handled them brought criticism to the company and the FDA and were followed by reforms in the oversight and reporting of ICD and pacemaker safety. Still, many are concerned, they likely undermined the confidence of patients and referring physicians in one of the most successful therapies cardiology has to offer.

"The bad press did two things. It educated patients and physicians, but it also left them with a bad taste in their mouth regarding the therapy," Dr William Maisel (Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, MA) told heartwire. "I'd say 90% of their questions are negative, questions about what can go wrong instead of about how the device can save their lives."


"Perceptions" of risk take hold

The current rate of ICD implantations throughout the US is widely perceived as stagnant or close to it despite a growing candidate population, a persisting belief that there are many more patients who qualify for ICDs than are actually getting them, and the opening up of the devices' Medicare reimbursement criteria.

When the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) expanded Medicare eligibility criteria for primary-prevention devices—first by obviating electrophysiologic screening after the MADIT-2 trial and then, in 2005, extending it most patients with an LVEF <35% based on SCD-HeFT [6]—many predicted an explosion of ICD use [7,8].

All that growth in the therapy would put an untenable burden on third-party payers, and there may not even be enough qualified physicians to do the procedures, it was said [9].

Physicians have not spent enough time talking to patients about how it's possible to avoid shocks, infections, and lead problems to make the real risk of the intervention much smaller.

Maisel observed that ICD use climbed exponentially until sometime in 2005 or so, tapering off as the Guidant recall drew attention to the device's limitations. Also, projections based on identifying and referring increasing numbers of eligible patients proved wrong, at least for now.

The reasons all qualified patients aren't getting the devices have changed over the years, observed Maisel. "If you had asked two or three years ago, the answer would have been a lack of education [about ICD treatment guidelines] among referring physicians."

But in the past year or two, he said, it's an image problem. The recalls and unprecedented public scrutiny "took a bit of the shine off the therapy." Although many referring physicians seem to believe the ICD failure rate is high, "the actual risk of a device malfunction harming a patient is very small," he said. "The overall therapy is very effective at doing what it's supposed to do, reducing the risk of sudden death."

Dr Bruce Wilkoff

Dr Bruce Wilkoff (Cleveland Clinic, OH) confirmed that the rate of ICD implantations at his center has been flat for at least the past year. "It has a lot to do with perceptions of risk vs benefit," he agreed. In the wake of the Guidant recalls, patients and their doctors "had blown concern for the risks of the therapy out of proportion," he told heartwire. "And physicians have not spent enough time talking to patients about how it's possible to avoid shocks, infections, and lead problems to make the real risk of the intervention much smaller."

Guidant had reported an 15% increase in US sales of ICDs from 2003 to 2004 (18% worldwide) but, beset with device failures, 2005 sales in the US fell off by 12% (although by only 6% worldwide) [10,11]. Its US defibrillator sales declined further during the first three quarters of 2006 but then rose 13% in the fourth quarter [12].

The sense that you get a benefit from a defibrillator from the first day it's put in, reassurance that you are protected all the time—that part of the benefit has to be sold.

Over at Medtronic, worldwide ICD and CRT-D sales surged 23% from fiscal years 2005 to 2006—largess, in part, stemming from Guidant's troubles; they then leveled off, rising a scant 1% in fiscal year 2007 [13].

Both companies foresee a "stabilizing" ICD market in the US and elsewhere for the near future, at least officially. Medtronic spokesperson Kyra Schmitt told heartwire that the company projects a worldwide rate of 225 000 to 250 000 ICD and CRT-D implantations per year over all device manufacturers.

Use of the devices will grow again, "but it's going to grow more slowly," according to Wilkoff. "There's a fair amount of education that needs to be done, but it's going to take some time." One way to help regain the confidence of patients and physicians would be to portray ICDs as more than potentially life-saving. "The sense that you get a benefit from a defibrillator from the first day it's put in, reassurance that you are protected all the time—that part of the benefit has to be sold," he said.

"The therapy is obviously here to stay," observed Maisel. But, "I think it's unlikely we'll see the days of 15% to 20% growth again."


Misconceptions about flagging ICD use?

Dr Mandeep R Mehra

Dr Mandeep R Mehra (University of Maryland, Baltimore) agreed that fallout from the Guidant recalls "may have created some physician angst" that cut into ICD referrals, but told heartwire what he thinks is a more likely reason. "Taking care of the prevalent population created a new bolus of procedures." Referrals for ICDs did go up with broadening Medicare eligibility, he said, but that growth wasn't sustained and, in fact, soon subsided to a "steady-state level." Mehra acknowledged that this scenario hasn't necessarily been documented, but "it makes simple sense."

Agreed Dr Clyde Yancy (Baylor Heart and Vascular Institute, Dallas, TX), "At the beginning, you may have had lots of patients with a [primary-prevention] indication for the device, but in real time, the new candidates coming online for eligibility are not as many as people think."

Dr Clyde Yancy

Yancy told heartwire that the Guidant-recall saga probably didn't tarnish the ICD's image enough to entirely account for flagging implantation rates. "I think, at best, that's a minor reason." The major reasons are probably numerous and have less do with either recalls or reimbursement criteria than industry analysts think, he said.

Evidence-based therapy, whether drugs or devices, can take years to reach the level of routine patient care, Yancy observed. It's taken about 18 years for ACE inhibitors to reach the currently high level of guidelines-consistent use in heart failure, about 80%. Even beta blockers are at only about the 70% level, he noted.

As we persevere and uptitrate the beta blockers, we actually see ejection fractions improve to a point where they no longer meet the criteria for device implantation.

"That's been driven hard by guidelines and continuing medical education programs, and we're just barely moving the needle—getting better, admittedly, but not where we should be," Yancy said. "So one could make the argument that, based on the penetration of devices now, they could be ahead of the curve."

Mehra advanced the idea that the highly developed state of neurohormonal drug therapy for LV dysfunction and heart failure could help explain why ICDs haven't taken off as expected. "With a good high dose of beta blockers, many of these patients initially might look like we should put a device in them, but as we persevere and uptitrate the beta blockers, we actually see ejection fractions improve to a point where they no longer meet the criteria for device implantation," Mehra said. "So there is a gap, but it's not nearly as wide as originally projected."

He predicts that any significant growth in ICD use will come from expanding indications rather than by implanting more patients who qualify. Future ICD candidates might include, for example, patients with asymptomatic LV dysfunction, or, Mehra said, a population that's like to grow considerably as drug therapy improves: those who had been in heart failure but whose symptoms are entirely under control.

Maisel said he has no industry relationships to disclose. Wilkoff reports having served as a speaker or consultant and received research funding from Biotronik, Boston Scientific, Medtronic, Sorin, and St Jude Medical. Mehra said he has received research funding and/or consulting fees from Boston Scientific, Medtronic, and St Jude Medical. Yancy is the current chair of the FDA Circulatory System Devices Panel and is a co-principal investigator of the Medtronic-supported Registry to Improve the Use of Evidence-Based Heart Failure Therapies in the Outpatient Setting (IMPROVE-HF).All interviews conducted specifically for this story with the above physicians occurred prior to the Spring Fidelis defibrillator lead recall.

Sources
  1. Food and Drug Administration. Statement on Medtronic's voluntary market suspension of their Sprint Fidelis defibrillator leads. October 15, 2007. Available at: http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01724.html.
  2. Mathews AW, Burton TM. Medtronic and FDA face scrutiny on safety issues. Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2007. Available at: http://www.wsj.com.
  3. Medtronic Inc. Medtronic voluntarily suspends distribution of Sprint Fidelis defibrillation leads. Physician experts advise against prophylactic replacement of implanted leads. October 15, 2007. Available at: http://wwwp.medtronic.com/Newsroom/NewsReleaseDetails.do?itemId=1192213397218&lang=en_US.
  4. Medtronic Inc. Urgent medical device information Sprint Fidelis lead patient management recommendations. October 15, 2007. Available at: http://www.medtronic.com/fidelis/physician-letter.html.
  5. Mathews AW, Burton TM. Heart wires may pose more risk for the young. Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2007. Available at: http://www.wsj.com.
  6. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Decision memo for implantable defibrillators (CAG-00157R3). January 27, 2005. Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/viewdecisionmemo.asp?id=148.
  7. Jauhar S, Slotwiner DJ. The economics of ICDs. N Engl J Med 2004; 351:2542-2544.
  8. McClellan MB, Tunis SR. Medicare coverage of ICDs. N Engl J Med 2005; 352:222-224.
  9. Al-Khatib SM, Anstrom KJ, Eisenstein EL, et al. Clinical and economic implications of the Multicenter Automatic Defibrillator Implantation Trial-II. Ann Intern Med 2005; 142:593-600.
  10. Guidant 2004 Financial summary. Jan 27, 2005. Available at: http://bostonscientific.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=64&item=188.
  11. Guidant 2005 Financial summary. Jan 27, 2006. Available at: http://bostonscientific.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=64&cat=3.
  12. Boston Scientific annual report 2006. Available at: http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/62/62272/reports/AR06.pdf.
  13. Medtronic annual report 2007. Available at: http://216.139.227.101/interactive/mdt2007.



Your comments
"Perceptions" and misconceptions: Are device "recalls" holding back the growth of ICD therapy?
# 1 of 2
October 27, 2007 09:10 (EDT)
Melissa Walton-Shirley
Less than perfect
In the early 1990's, in a town of 16,000 our practice implanted 14 atrial teletronics j-leads. This number pales in comparison to large implant centers, but these were not just patients referred to us then swallowed up by outlying pacermaker clinics for long term follow up. These were our neighbors, the people who sat three rows back and to the left of us in church and folks we met at the local restaurant on Friday night. 14 times we had to sit down, explain the risks of lead extraction, death, the need for long term follow up and then had to field phone calls from frantic out of town sons and daughters.
In 14 patients, we scheduled Q 6 month flouo exams and scatched our heads in the pre-digital days when we couldn't tell if that bump on the lead was an early fracture or a pixel artifact. We then sent the patients home to worry for 6 more months and we worried for 6 more months as well for each and every one of them. All of those patients have now died of natural causes (or so we think), and one had their lead extracted. We were naive. We thought device companies had learned their lessons and from their mistakes. Instead, the recalls just keep coming. It's The nature of the beast I guess and we should accept it. Or should we?
Why can't we test these devices and leads longer before we put them on the market? Should there be some independant testing center that puts them all through the same rigorous exam prior to implanting them in the masses? Since this imperfection came to light fairly soon after it came to market wouldn't longer testing have found it out prior to getting them into the hearts of so many of our patients? Isn't that what the FDA is supposed to be doing? Do we really need leads that thin in adults and don't we have leads that work well enough for now to wait for safety?
In the land of plenty, we are conditioned to uphold lemon laws on all home appliances and automobiles. It's "100% satisfaction or your money back" AND a new car or appliance. If it doesn't happen, your friendly local injury lawyer who advertises non stop during "My name is Earl" will make certain of it. But in the medical world where it's life or death, we are forced to accept even expect imperfection.
The atrial teletronics j-lead fiasco retired me from the pacer world. I admit, I just don't have the stomach or the guts to deal with gambling on whether the device companies can balance between profit margin and safety. My willing partners have weathered all of the storms competently. I am satisfied to implant the occasional emergency temporary lead and hide safely but cowardly in my comfort zone in the cath, stress echo and nuclear labs.
It's been a red letter month in the device/medication/trial impropriety world. For now, I'll just make out a new consent form for my outpatient DEFINITY patients, prepare a pat conversation for my Sprint lead patients and wonder if PFO closure really cures migraine (I think it can). It's no wonder that patients lose confidence when physicians are growing weary and leary of each and every new entity brought to us for use by a well meaning color coordinated food bearing rep.
Next week, I get to tell my patient who just had a heart attack, with a low EF, on his second MVR who came home with his ICD accidentally not turned on,.......... that he now has an ICD that IS turned on, but it might be defective. I guess he'll get the point that the medical world and all of its devices, medications and physicians is less than perfect.
That's because it is...but "less than perfect" will never be good enough.
Melissa
# 2 of 2
October 27, 2007 10:05 (EDT)
Randall Starling
devices
Many issues relate to device implantation and certainly recalls and what appears in the media can impact patient decisions. Two main areas impact device referral and acceptance for patients that clearly meet the indications as defined in the guidelines. First we as the heart failure community must see that primary care physicians that treat the overwhelminng majority of these patients are well educated. Second heart failure specialists must also feel comfortable with the current guidelines and be willing to spend significant amounts of their time educating their patients. Certainly the electrophysiologisit plays a key role but in most heart failure disease management clinics patients turn to their nurses and physicians to help them make decisions. It is not uncommon for me to spend 10-15 minutes with a patient and the family in a discussion about device indications and my recommendations. It may take 2 or 3 visits and discussions before the patient becomes comfortable with making a decision to proceed. A therapy that provides theoretical protection for a low probability event, similar to an auto airbag, is more difficult for a patient to accept from a risk benefit perspective. I expect that CRT is more widely accepted as it can make a patient "feel better" rapidly and that is the issue the patient focuses on rather than the remote event of device failure. In summary I believe HF specialists must continue to provide the education to patients and referring physicians about evidence based medical and device therapy and eventually we will see the evidence based use of ICDs move from 30% penetration upward toward the levels seens with pharmacotherapy.

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